Public Disclosure and Bank Failures

by Tito Cordella of the International Monetary Fund, and
Eduardo Levy Yeyati of the International Monetary Fund

March 1998

Abstract: We study how public disclosure of banks' risk exposure affects banks' risk taking incentives and assesses the impact of the presence of informed depositors on the soundness of the banking system. We find that when banks have complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure reduces the probability of banking crisis. However, when banks do not control their risk exposure, the presence of informed depositors may increase the probability of bank failures.

JEL Classification: D28, G14, G21, G28.

Published in: IMF, Staff Papers, Vol. 45, No. 1, (March 1998), pp. 110-131.

Download paper (1,219K PDF) 22 pages

[Home] [Supervisory Papers]

[ Home ] [ Up ]

Please contact me with problems or suggestions.
Copyright © 2000-2008 DefaultRisk.com
Last modified: July 24, 2008